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THE THIRD MESSAGE OF ISLAM?
Upendra Baxi*
ABSTRACT
Professor Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im makes a spirited call for reformation
of the Shari’a human rights, democracy, and constitutional compliance. He does
so not as the problem of any metaphysical framework, or everydayness of the
“fatigue of the Sharia,” but as accentuating a moral duty of non-humiliation
itself as a human right to live with dignity as the core of Islam and all other
religions. He crafts Islamic traditions of dialogue in a world that increasingly
only knows the demagogic soliloquies of power. An-Na’im follows the
“moderate revolutionary” Ustadh Mohamad Taha, who offered the Second
Message of Islam, espousing the Mecca school over the Medina school in, at the
least, ameliorating practices of discrimination against women and noncoreligionists. But An-Na’im is best understood as offering a Third Message,
showing how the traditions of pious interpretation can be further deployed
creatively in making religious thought and practices compliant with the ideas of
democracy, contemporary pious interpretation, and classical liberal
constitutionalism. His favorite strategy for this is “dialogue,” defying the world
of power and propaganda relentlessly pursuing monologues. Indeed,
“dialogue” glides into accommodation, mediation, and institutionalization.
However, it never embraces theocratic state formations. This Essay generally
explores: (1) the multifaceted aspects of spiritual and reformist legacies of AnNa’im; (2) the role of theopolitics in promoting cross-cultural dialogue
concerning Shari’a, constitutional secularism, and human rights (nonhegemonic human rights thought and practice); (3) the role of “civic reason;”
and, very briefly, (4) the tasks ahead.

*
Professor Upendra Baxi is an Emeritus Professor of Law at the University of Warwick and Delhi, and
has served as Vice Chancellor at the University of South Gujarat, Surat, and the University of Delhi.
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ESSAY
That there are worlds before and beyond the West is the non-Eurocentric
message of a handful of truly postcolonial law academics—and one hopes their
tribe will continue to grow even in neoliberal human futures. For, even in a world
where power is unaccountable to people, bereft of core human rights of masses,
and remains above the calls for justice, there at least stands a duty of nonhumiliation serving as a claim of justice.1 Professor Abdullahi Ahmed AnNa’im2 makes a spirited call for reformation of the Shari’a human rights,
democracy, and constitutional compliance. He does not do so as the problem of
any particular metaphysical framework, or everydayness of the “fatigue of the
Shari‘a,”3 but as accentuating a moral duty of non-humiliation itself as a human
right to live with dignity as the core of Islam and all other religions.
Given the pattern of new racism—prolific hatred of the other and their
culture and religion—Jacques Derrida speaks of the same duty as the universal
duty of hospitality to the other,4 which Emmanuel Levinas, uncannily straddling
cultures, earlier addressed as “the face of the other[.]”5 Abdullahi exemplifies
the sane voice and craft of Islamic traditions of dialogue in a world that
1
The fundamental human right to non-discrimination against women and non-religionists entails
equality, dignity, and decency as ingredients of international human rights. See Upendra Baxi, Humiliation and
Justice, in HUMILIATION: CLAIMS AND COUNTER-CLAIMS (Gopal Guru ed., 2009); DORIS SCHROEDER & ABOLHASSAN BANI-SADR, DIGNITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: MIDDLE EAST AND WEST (2017) (insightfully seeking to
harmonize the “Western” approaches to dignity with the Quranic ways of interpretation); see also AVISHAI
MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY (Naomt Goldblum trans., 1996).
2
Hereinafter called “Abdullahi,” as known to his colleagues, friends, and students.
3
See AHMAD ATIF AHMAD, THE FATIGUE OF THE SHARI’A (2012). Ahmad begins his book by providing
some tentative answers to questions such as: “Could God’s guidance, available to previous generations as
religious histories tell us, simply cease to be accessible at some point? Has this already happened; is it about to
happen? Assuming these questions are clear enough, at least the following potential answers can be given to
them: (1) yes, this has already happened—the revelations of ‘prophets’ such as Abraham, Moses, and
Muhammad are already irrelevant to modern life; (2) no, knowledge and adherence to divine revelations has not
faded away, but this might happen soon, in the near future, that is—or some may want to put it this way—we
will soon be unable to access or make sense of any of these ‘divine revelations’; (3) no, this will never happen,
because God will never abandon humanity.” Id. at 1.
4
See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, ON COSMOPOLITANISM AND FORGIVENESS (Mark Dooley & Michael
Hughes trans., 2005) (discussing the right to asylum and the duty to hospitality). One wonders whether the
dimension of “forgiving the unforgivable,” or in the diction of Hannah Arendt, “the modern history of minorities,
of those ‘without a State,’ the Heimatlosen, of the stateless and homeless, and of deported and ‘displaced
persons’” features strongly in Islam. Id. at 6.
5
EMMANUEL LEVINAS, On the Rights of Man and the Rights of Others, in OUTSIDE THE SUBJECT
(Michael. B. Smith trans., 1994). This work remains a germinal text not only because it articulates a fuller
understanding of this “original right” of the other but because it also furnishes some terminal bases of critique
of both the “modern” and the “contemporary” paradigms of human rights. Id.; see also Upendra Baxi, Judging
Emmanuel Levinas? Some Reflections on Reading “Levinas, Law, Politics”, 72 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2009)
(reviewing MARINOS DIAMANTIDES, LEVINAS, LAW, POLITICS (2009)).
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increasingly only knows the demagogic soliloquies of power. He stands tall in
relation to Islamic law reform, comparative studies in law and religion, and the
relationship of human rights to constitutionalism.6 In this Essay, I generally
explore: (1) the multifaceted aspects of spiritual and reformist legacies of
Abdullahi; (2) the role of theopolitics in promoting cross-cultural dialogue
concerning Shari’a, constitutional secularism, and human rights (nonhegemonic human rights thought and practice); (3) the role of “civic reason;”
and 4) the tasks ahead.
Similar questions remain pertinent in a Godless world, where social
responsibility is imagined to be owed to a degree of piety toward the text, canon,
and intended and implied communities of readers. However Godless or secular
the world, we need to revisit traditions. Urgent, too, remain the issues raised
concerning reading the practices of power and domination, often expressed in
the languages of the social responsibility of multinational enterprises, or now in
terms of business ethics. These networks create mass toxic disasters; the violated
humanity often experiences the “normative” languages of corporate
responsibility as those of irresponsibility or impunity.7
Abdullahi inherited and improvised the tradition of pious interpretation. That
tradition requires immersion into the sacred and holy, a deep and abiding faith
in the Prophet (PBUH), and the acts of prophecy. Interpretation also entails a
responsibility to Allah, his messenger, and the community (a congregation of
co-believers). In this respect, while he is a close follower of Ustadh Taha,
Abdullahi goes far beyond in showing how religion and democracy go together,
and how human rights, constitutionalism, and various core freedoms are
essential for the believers. In this respect, Abdullahi emerges as no mere Islamic
modernist.
Although I suspect that Abdullahi would not accept the honor, I characterize
his corpus as the Third Message of Islam. His works speak to us now at the end
of the second decade of the twenty-first century, in the zodiacs of global
awareness and experience of accelerating anthropogenic harm, authoritarian
6
Perhaps, the best vignette introduction is by William Twining in the chapter on Abdullahi in HUMAN
RIGHTS, SOUTHERN VOICES: FRANCIS DENG, ABDULLAHI AN-NA‘IM, YASH GHAI, AND UPENDRA BAXI 53–58
(William Twining ed., 2009).
7
One hopes that aside from practices of discrimination forbidden by law and religion, Abdullahi will
more searchingly examine other concerns such as human rights law and business. See, e.g., Upendra Baxi,
Keynote Address—Does Life Indeed Begin at Sixty? Revisiting the UDHR as a “Single Garment Of Destiny” in
a Hyperglobalzing World, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 25 (2009); Upendra Baxi, Human Rights Responsibility of
Multinational Corporations, Political Ecology of Injustice: Learning from Bhopal Thirty Plus?, 1 BUS. & HUM.
RTS. J. 21 (2015).
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legality,8 and new forms of algorithmic governmentality.9 The Third Message
speaks to us, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, about the pertinence of human
rights-based limited governmentality and against theocratic state formations. It
is worth always listening to his wise words:
I speak as a Muslim in this book because I am accountable for these
ideas as part of my own religion and not simply as a hypothetical
academic argument. But the focus of my proposal is the public role of
Shari’a, not matters of religious doctrine and spiritual practice in the
private, personal domain. While Muslims are my primary audience,
non-Muslims should also participate in debating the public role of
because what Muslims think and do about these issues affects human
beings everywhere.10

As is well known, Abdullahi came to learning and teaching about human
rights by knowing and practicing Islam, with Ustadh Mahmoud Mohamed Taha,
in the Sudan. The Ustadh broadcasted to a small congregation his rather
unorthodox teaching of the “Second Message of Islam.” It postulated that the
verses revealed in Mecca expounding freedom and equality formed the ideal
religion, to be realized only when humankind proved capable of accepting it and
reached an appropriate stage of development. He was martyred and executed for

8
See THE POLITICS OF LEGALITY IN A NEOLIBERAL AGE (Ben Golder & Daniel McLoughlin eds., 2018);
WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION (2015).
9
See Patrick Crogan, Bernard Stiegler on Algorithmic Governmentality: A New Regimen of Truth?, 98
NEW FORMATIONS: J. CULTURE, THEORY, POL. 48 (2019); Antoinette Rouvroy & Thomas Berns, Algorithmic
Governmentality and Prospects of Emancipation: Disparateness as a Precondition for Individuation Through
Relationships?, 177 RÉSEAUX 163 (Elizabeth Libbrecht trans., 2013); Antoinette Rouvroy, Technology,
Virtuality and Utopia: Governmentality in an Age of Autonomic Computing, in LAW, HUMAN AGENCY AND
AUTONOMIC COMPUTING: PHILOSOPHERS OF LAW MEET PHILOSOPHERS OF TECHNOLOGY (M. Hildebrandt & A.
Rouvroy eds., 2011).
10
See ABDULLAHI AHMED AN NA‘IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF
SHARI‘A xvii (2008) [hereinafter ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE]. I have replaced “Shariàa” in quotes that
follow the standard English usage “Shari’a.” While Abdullahi will certainly agree with Gustav Landauer, who
observed that “there is no creation without community, spirit, and love” and that the “[g]eneral Idea of the
Revolution in the Nineteenth Century Socialism is the attempt to lead man’s common life to a bond of common
spirit in freedom, that is, to religion,” quoted in SAMUEL HAYIM BRODY, MARTIN BUBER’S THEOPOLITICS 34
(2018), he would not have fully endorsed the view of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Proudhon wrote:
To be governed is to be at every operation, at every transaction, noted, registered, enrolled, taxed,
stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorized, admonished, forbidden, reformed, corrected,
punished. It is, under the pretext of public utility, and in the name of the general interest, to be placed under
contribution, trained, ransomed, exploited, monopolized, extorted, squeezed, mystified, robbed; then, at the
slightest resistance, the first word of complaint, to be repressed, fined, despised, harassed, tracked, abused,
clubbed, disarmed, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, shot, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed; and, to
crown all, mocked, ridiculed, outraged, dishonored. That is government; that is its justice; that is its morality.
Preface to BRODY, supra (quoting PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, THE GENERAL IDEA OF THE
REVOLUTION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1851)).
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apostasy for his religious preaching at the age of seventy-six by the regime of
Gaafar Nimeiry.11
I will not elaborate on what Ustadh Taha, the “moderate martyr,”12 conveyed
in any grand detail. As Meir Hatna writes, it is true that:
In many respects, Sudan was the outer edge of the Arab world, so that
Taha represented the geographic periphery of Arab thought.
Nevertheless, his career and work became widely known beyond
Sudanese borders, especially after his execution in 1985. Some of
Taha’s methods and principles even trickled down into liberal
discourse, providing further evidence of Arab liberalism as a lively
community discourse that crossed geographic and political borders.13

But it must be said that Ustadh Taha proposed an Islam of the future which
radically related it to modern conditions and contexts. His search was not for a
utopia, but for a quickening of present conditions of people living under Islam
in ways that will at least ameliorate discrimination against women and noncoreligionists. This profoundly transformative quest has been carried forward,
enriched, and innovated by Abdullahi with a gentle but firm vehemence.

11
See MAHMOUD MOHAMED TAHA, THE SECOND MESSAGE OF ISLAM (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im
trans., 1986). The absence of any mention of apostasy in the penal codes of some Islamic countries in no way
implies that a Muslim is free to leave his religion. In reality, the lacunae in the penal codes are filled by Islamic
Law, as in the case of Mohamed Taha, executed for apostasy in the Sudan in 1985. See Comm’n on Hum. Rts.,
Rep. on the Work of Its Sixtieth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/127 (Mar. 15–Apr. 23, 2004). However, as
Abdullahi notes, in a posthumous appeal, the Supreme Court of Sudan held the entire trial and punishment “null
and void[,]” stressing “faults of the whole episode, including clear violations of fundamental, constitutionally
guaranteed safeguards and violations of the 1983 ‘Islamic’ laws themselves.” Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im,
Introduction to THE SECOND MESSAGE OF ISLAM 18. See Generally, Erfan Efendi et. al., The Logic of Ibn
Warraq’s Islamic Apostasy, 492 ADVANCES SOC. SCI., EDUC. HUMAN. RSCH, 217 (2020) (being the proceedings
of Raden Intan International Conference on Muslim Societies and Social Sciences, held on 19–21 November
2019).
12
George Packer, The Moderate Martyr: A Radically Peaceful Vision of Islam, NEW YORKER (Sept. 11,
2006), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/09/11/the-moderate-martyr. Packer writes, “[T]he real
drama in Islam is the essential dilemma addressed by Taha: how to revive ancient sacred texts in a way that
allows one to live in the modern world.” Id. Abdullahi’s “quandary over Islam was an intensely personal
conflict—he called it a ‘deadlock.’” Id. What Abdullahi heard at Taha’s lecture resolved it. Taha said that the
Sudanese constitution needed to be reformed to reconcile “the individual’s need for absolute freedom with the
community’s need for total social justice.” Id. This political ideal, he argued, could be best achieved not through
Marxism or liberalism, but through Islam—that is, Islam in its original, uncorrupted form, in which women and
people of other faiths were accorded equal status. “As Na‘im listened, a profound sense of peace washed over
him; he joined Taha’s movement, which came to be known as the Republican Brothers, and the night that had
begun so idly changed his life.” Id.
13
See Meir Hatina, Dismantling the Sacred in the Name of Humanity: Mahmud Muhammad Taha’s
Cultural Revolution, 27 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 1, 37 (2021).
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The way in which he carries this new message is important. In his most
definitive work, Islam and the Secular State, Abdullahi is not talking about
“dialogue” but “negotiation.”14 At times, he also uses the term “mediation.” He
is also thinking of cross-cultural dialogue between Muslims and Muslims, nonMuslims, and others. He would let the meanings of these different terms emerge
in various contexts rather than generalize them in one stipulative definition. But
Abdullahi is very clear on two things (with which I fully agree). First, we must
oppose the “domineering visions of a universal history and future in which the
‘enlightened West’ is leading all of humanity to the secularization of the world,
in which the secularity of the state is the logical outcome.”15 Second, we cannot
separate “negotiation” from “mediation” because “there is no categorical and
permanent resolution of the paradox of how to secure the religious neutrality of
the state within the reality of the connectedness of Islam and politics.”16 This
steady gaze on mutual accommodation among contesting principles and a
“process-based model of negotiated secularism and the rehabilitation of religion
in public life”17 takes us away from the rather esoteric theological discourse—
say, the paradigmatic theology in Buber’s I and Thou.18 It also risks the neglect
of other kindred notions such as the prolix theoretical discourse regarding
dialogue—be it about discursive autonomy, dialogical equality, or discursive
coalitions.19 Clearly, Abdullahi is at home in deploying the notion of negotiation
among rival positions (or a Habermasian way of enlightened self-interest as
14

See Islam and the Secular State, supra note 10.
ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 10, at 268.
16
Id. at 267.
17
Id. at 268.
18
MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Ronald Gregor Smith trans., 1937).
19
See generally PEOPLE’S MOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS LEARNING, HUMAN RIGHTS LEARNING: A
PEOPLE’S REPORT (Upendra Baxi et al. eds., 2006), https://www.pdhre.org/report. Abdullahi has lots to say about
interpretation but not much about norms at the levels of social theory, where the major problem is both to be
determined and yet also has a determinative effect. NEGOTIATING NORMATIVITY: POSTCOLONIAL
APPROPRIATIONS, CONTESTATIONS, AND TRANSFORMATIONS (Nikita Dhawan et al. eds., 2016). Abdullahi, of
course, emphasizes discursive equality (although he is averse to high theories and models). For example, he
maintains that:
15

[C]omparative reflection upon actual experiences, after the fact and over long periods of time.
No society or region of the world has the power or authority to define these concepts for others,
though all societies can and do learn from each other’s experiences, even when that is not realized
or acknowledged.
ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 10, at 272. However, it must be said that while concepts may be
distinctive, and may vary across time and space, holding them as unique may thwart any comparison among
human cultures. In this context, it must be said that conspicuous by absence is thinking about deliberative
democracy, which looks similar to Islam and Shari’a as unfolding in ijtihad. See DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY:
ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS (James Bohman et al. eds., 1997); Joshua Cohen, Democracy, in
DELIBERATION, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY: CAN THE PEOPLE GOVERN? 219 (Shawn W. Rosenberg ed.,
2007).
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“taking interest in one’s interests”20) in a work-a-day sense as a give and take
relationship.
Nevertheless, what does one have, and what does one give away, while
negotiating? While issues of “self-perception, location, and context in present
Islamic societies” are important,21 Abdullahi is very empathic in stressing the
fundamental axiom of Shari’a which by its “nature and purpose . . . can only be
freely observed by believers; its principles lose their religious authority and
value when enforced by the state.”22 He asserts that as a matter of fundamental
religious perspective, “the state must not be allowed to claim the authority of
implementing Shari’a as such.”23 This strikes a death-blow to the very idea of a
theocratic state, and also by a creeping theocracy, recently called “stealth
theocracy.”24 It is a “dangerous illusion”25 that the legitimacy of a Muslim state
depends on Shari’a being the grundnorm of the state and law implementation.26

20
See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (1968); Axel Honneth, Is There an
Emancipatory Interest? An Attempt to Answer Critical Theory’s Most Fundamental Question, EUR. J. PHIL. 908,
909 (2016).
21
ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 10, at vii; see also Turan Kayaoglu, Constructing the
Dialogue of Civilizations in World Politics: A Case of Global Islamic Activism, 23 ISLAM & CHRISTIAN–MUSLIM
RELS. 129, 129 (2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2012.655064; Anicée Van Engeland, Bridging
Civilizations: Public Policy and Western-Muslim Intersections: The New Hermeneutics of Islamic Law, in
ENGAGING THE OTHER 116 (Karim H. Karim et al. eds., 2014). Kayagolu identifies a “tripartite requirement”
stressing “(1) the value of a plurality of civilizations; (2) the necessity for an international order that
accommodates the plurality of civilizations; and (3) that dialogue and goodwill among people who identify with
different civilizations are essential in order to achieve peaceful coexistence.” Id. at 130. These capture the
“discourse and activities of the diverse groups that define themselves and their efforts as part of the dialogue of
civilizations.” Id.
22
ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 10, at 4.
23
Id.
24
See Yvonne Tew, Stealth Theocracy, 58 VA. J. INT’L L. 32, 33 (2018). Abdullahi elaborates the
voluntariness of Shari’a as follows: it plays a decisive role in “socialization of children and the sanctification of
social institutions and relationships[,]” Shari’a plays a “fundamental role in shaping and developing ethical
norms and values that can be reflected in general is legislation and public policy through the democratic political
process.” ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 10, at 1. However,

Shari’a principles cannot be enacted and enforced by the state as public law and public policy
solely on the grounds that they are believed to be part of Shari’a. If such enactment and
enforcement is attempted, the outcome will necessarily be the political will of the state and not
the religious law of Islam.
Id.
25
ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 10, at 2; see also id. at 271 (“There is a dialectic
relationship between the local, deeply contextual experience of various societies and universal norms or
principles that can be extrapolated from those experiences. There is no abstract or preconceived universally
agreed-upon blueprint of what constitutionalism, citizenship, civil society, and civic reason must mean.”).
26
Id. at 2.
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A corollary of this axiomatic aspect of Shari’a is that a secular state which
respects all religions is a pre-condition for Islamic belief and practice. Abdullahi
insists that a secular state is thus “fundamentally Islamic, because it insists on
the religious neutrality of the state as a necessary condition for Muslims to
comply with their religious obligations. Religious compliance must be
completely voluntary according to personal pious intention (niyah), which is
necessarily invalidated by coercive enforcement of those obligations.”27 It
follows that any “coercive enforcement promotes hypocrisy (nifaq), which is
categorically and repeatedly condemned by the Qur’an.”28
Moreover, all basic doctrines sustain legality in ways not specifically known
to Western pioneers of political theory. But now, it is almost normatively
commonplace to acknowledge that the rule of law, separation of powers, and
contemporary human rights constitute basic axioms of democratic law and
governance.29 One may say that Islam not merely anticipates, but also
presupposes these values. These accord well with Islam and Shari’a—which also
rest on the broad principles of modern law. “Determinations about whether or
not any text (nass) of the Qur’an or Sunna applies to an issue, whether or not it
is categorical (qat’i’), and who can exercise ijtihad and how[,]” says Abdullahi,
“are all matters that can be decided only through human reasoning and
judgment.”30 Additionally, interpretation cannot occur in the condition of
censorship.31 Therefore, it is “illogical to say that ijtihad cannot be exercised
regarding any issue or question, because that determination itself is the product
of human reasoning and reflection.”32 Abdullahi also notes that it is “dangerous
to limit the ability to exercise ijtihad to a restricted group of Muslims who are
supposed to have specific qualities, because in practice that will depend on those
human beings who set the criteria and select a person as a qualified mujtahid.”33
Abdullahi finds consensus of the community embedded in Shari’a:
The power to decide who is qualified to exercise ijtihad and how it is
to be exercised is part of the religious belief and obligation of every
Muslim. Any restriction of free debate by entrusting human beings or

27

Id. at 4.
Id.
29
See UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 38–67 (3d ed., 1993).
30
ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 10, at 14.
31
Id.
32
Id. “Further, the requirement of “knowing and upholding Shari’a” as the “permanent and inescapable
responsibility of every Muslim means that no human being or institution should control this process.” Id.
33
Id.
28
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institutions with authority to decide which views are to be allowed or
suppressed is inconsistent with the religious nature of Shari’a itself.34

Further, assuming that the gates of ijtihad were properly closed in the seventh
century AD, subsequent generations—the future community of believers—
commit no wrong or sin in reopening them. “From an Islamic point of view, no
human authority was or is entitled to declare that ijtihad is not permitted,” writes
Abdullahi, “though there may have been consensus on this matter among
Muslims. There is nothing to prevent the emergence of a new consensus that
ijtihad should be freely exercised to meet the new needs and aspirations of
Islamic societies.”35 “[P]rofound dialogue and exchange across ancient and
medieval civilizations and into the colonial and postcolonial era,” have existed
and animate understanding of “shared visions of human dignity and social
justice[.]”36 Any hasty diagnosis of its absence in the past and “in the future”
will mark “them-and-us dichotomy; indeed, confrontation and hostility tend to
beget the same in response.”37
Abdullahi’s deeper sense that secularism is critical is manifested in his
statement that “[b]elief in Islam, or any other religion, logically requires the
possibility of disbelief, because belief has no value if it is coerced. If I am unable
to disbelieve, I will not be able to believe.”38 Therefore, “[m]aintaining
institutional separation between Islam and the state while regulating the
permanent connection of Islam and politics is a necessary condition for
achieving the positive role for the Shari’a in future.”39 A secular state is “a
necessary framework for negotiating ethical differences among citizens, but not
for adjudicating and resolving such differences,”40 because it “is able to unite
diverse communities of belief and practice into one political community

34

Id.
Id. at 15; see also Van Engeland, supra note 21; Kayaoglu, supra note 21.
36
ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 10, at 272.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 268. This observation relates “secularism” with phenomenology of belief. But as Daniel Philpott
says: “What is interesting about these arguments is that they ground the case for the secular state not in the
Quran, not in claims about the presence of the imago Dei in the person or in some other source of the person’s
intrinsic dignity, not in natural law, some closely similar type of practical reason, or universal moral precepts,
but rather in what might be called ‘second order’ observations about the phenomenology of belief, the character
of government, the lessons of history, and the like. To be sure, good reasons for the secular state lie therein. But
are these arguments sufficient to ground an Islamic case for constitutionalism, human rights, and the secular
state? I doubt it.” Daniel Philpott, Arguing with An-Na‘im, IMMANENT FRAME (July 14, 2008), https://tif.ssrc.org/
2008/07/14/arguing-with-An-Na‘im.
39
ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 10, at 268.
40
Id. at 276.
35
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precisely because the moral claims it makes are limited and thus unlikely to be
the source of serious disagreement[.]”41
It is in his various writings on human rights that we find Abdullahi’s visions
of linkages between Islam and human rights.42 He speaks of “global justice” as
comprising “globally inclusive conceptions of justice to be realized by human
beings for themselves, everywhere, through their own self-determination” and
the “focus on Muslims as believers seeking justice for themselves and other
human beings, in solidarity and cooperation, rather than speaking of Islam as a
religion.”43 One sees here at play, though not noted, some basic ideas of what
was chastened earlier by Wolfgang Friedmann as “international law of
cooperation” and by Sir Wilfred Jenks as “common law of mankind.”44
Moreover, one is constantly reminded of John Rawls’ The Law of Peoples,
which foregrounds five types of societies and eight principles of justice.45 The
tasks of “reimagining global justice” entail shifting “focus from the present
statecentric view of international law and relations to a people-centered
approach to human rights and constant self-determination of persons and
communities.”46 What distinguishes Abdullahi’s approach from John Rawls is
the emphasis on “inclusive and uncensored dialogue among religious and
cultural traditions of the world[]” without “the imposition of specific
theologically or philosophically conditioned conceptions of justice by some
societies on others.”47
We limit our discussion only to one aspect, namely the principle of Liberal
Responsible Pluralism (LRP, also called at times the “left liberalism”48). The
LRP, as primarily enunciated by Rawls, speaks to us in terms of normative
exclusion (even outlawry) of any “compressive” view from the public sphere.

41

Id.
ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA‘IM, MUSLIMS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (2011) [hereinafter MUSLIMS AND
GLOBAL JUSTICE].
43
Id. at 1.
44
WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964); C. WILFRED
JENKS, COMMON LAW OF MANKIND (1958). Of course, Jenks wrote the work before the replacement
‘humankind’ was considered more politically correct.
45
See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES: WITH “THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED”
(2001)(proposing five types of international society and eight principles of the law of peoples); Upendra Baxi,
Some Notes on John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, https://www.iea-nantes.fr/rtefiles/File/Ateliers/20140619-Huri/
baxi-some-notes-on-john-rawls-lop.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2022); see also Jane Mansbridge, A CitizenCentered Theory, 162 J. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 15 (2020).
46
MUSLIMS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 3 (alteration in original).
47
Id. at 3–5 (describing some basic principles).
48
See KATRINA FORRESTER, IN THE SHADOW OF JUSTICE: POSTWAR LIBERALISM AND THE REMAKING OF
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2019).
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The principle is justified because there abound a “diversity of reasonable
comprehensive . . . doctrines” and to achieve the “unity” of any political order
without “repression” (the avoidance of the use of coercion and force), we must
adopt this public political conception of arising from the reality of diversity.49
Rawls argues:
We honor public reason and its principle of legitimacy when three
conditions are satisfied: (a) hs; (b) we believe public reason is suitably
complete, that is, for at least the great majority of fundamental
questions, possibly for all, some combination and balance of political
value alone reasonably shows the answer; and finally(c) we believe
that the particular view we propose, and the law or policy based
thereon, expresses a reasonable combination and balance of those
values.50

While some support the LRP, some may still wish to say that this
formulation of LRP is not sufficient or viable to achieve a state of properly
justified legal violence in a liberal democratic order.51 However, I do not
rehearse their anxieties. Nor do I here look at some important deistic Christian,
new natural law literature which try to ground reason in faith, and even
revelation, and return to the role of religion in public square.52
Rather, I look closely at Abdullahi’s substitution of “political reason” with
“civic reason” in an essay that speaks of “friendly amendment.”53 Abdullahi
agrees with Rawls about “reliance on religious beliefs as the basis of public
policy and legislation, and his call for the articulation of reasons that are equally
49

JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 36 (1993).
Id. at 241.
51
See Jürgen Habermas, Reconciliation Through Public Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political
Liberalism, 92 J. PHIL. 109 (1995); Gerald F. Gaus, Reasonable Pluralism and the Domain of the Political: How
the Weaknesses of John Rawls’s Political Liberalism Can Be Overcome by a Justificatory Liberalism, 42
INQUIRY 259 (1999); Gerald F. Gaus, Reason, Justification and Consensus: Why Democracy Can’t Have It All,
in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 19, at 205–42; David Estlund, The Insularity of the Reasonable: Why
Political Liberalism Must Admit the Truth, 108 ETHICS 252 (1998); Michael J. Perry, Is the Idea of Human
Rights Ineliminably Religious?, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 1023 (1993).
52
See REASON, REVELATION, AND THE CIVIC ORDER: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE CLAIMS OF FAITH
(Carson Holloway et al. eds., 2014); PAUL R. DEHART, UNCOVERING THE CONSTITUTION’S MORAL DESIGN
(2017); NATURAL LAW AND EVANGELICAL POLITICAL THOUGHT (Jesse Covington et al. eds., 2012); see, e.g.,
Robert J. Joustra, The Coordinates of Covenantal Pluralism: Mapping Pluralist Theory in the 21st Century, 18
REV. FAITH & INT’L AFFS. 18 (2020).
53
Rawls cites Abdullahi’s work on Sharia as a perfect example of what he calls “overlapping consensus.”
This is the only time he cites a post-colonial Islamic scholar. When I excitedly shared this with Abdullahi, his
initial response was that he did not fancy himself as a close student of Western theorists. I am glad to find now
a long essay by him proposing a “friendly amendment” to Rawls. See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Islamic
Politics and the Neutral State: A Friendly Amendment to Rawls?, in RAWLS AND RELIGION 242 (Tom Bailey et
al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter Islamic Politics and the Neutral State].
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accessible to all citizens without reference to religious belief as such.”54 But he
differs from Rawls in thinking that “it is neither possible nor desirable to exclude
religion from politics, although religion should nonetheless be kept out of the
state by various mechanisms and strategies.”55 Abdullahi seeks to clarify that
“politics” would “encompass all public deliberations over policy, whether by
officials or private citizens, as distinct from the more settled, operational aspects
of the state.”56 In other words, the “state is the institutional continuity of
sovereignty, while politics refers to the government of the day.”57 This being the
case, it is simply unfair, or discriminatory, to “reject a view or discourse because
it is deemed to be religious,” and doing so is also “a form of anticipatory
censorship, which blocks the exercise of the fundamental human rights of
freedom of belief and to expression before a presumed harm is proven.”58 One
may not deploy a religious and secular dichotomy to disallow comprehensive
view or reason from entering the public arena.
Only framework restrictions provide a significant caveat:
[T]he freedom to express religious and other ‘comprehensive’ reasons
in politics and to organize politically to promote them should be
limited only if it violates the constitutional rights of others, as enforced
by the state, and not on the grounds of the kinds of reasons involved,
as Rawls’s theory insists.59

It is clear that the distiction, sought to be made by Abdullahi, between “civic
reason” and Rawlsian public reason is far from merely semantic. Civic reason
enlarges the public sphere by allowing in comprehensive doctrines, whereas
public reason shuts these out in the name of secularism. Civic reason also not
merely contests the colonial presentation of the religions of non-Euro others as
monolithic but insists on the heterogeneity of all religions. The deep pluralist in
Abdullahi comes alive when he insists that we non-essentialize the term
“religion” by talking only of religious traditions in their interaction. He
understands that multiple interpretations may exist of what Rawls meant by
forms of exclusion of religion. The search for the best interpretation of Rawls,
most apt within the framework of what Rawls said and may have meant, is
important for Rawlsian theory. But Abdullahi remains more interested in

54
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Islamic Politics and the Neutral State, supra note 54, at 261.
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Id. at 262.
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proving a more general point that all religious traditions are many-sided and
based on continuing interaction with others.60
This Article is an exercise in the retrieval of some basic aspects of
Abdullahi’s thought and an invitation for contemporary and future generations
of teachers and learners to take the second message and the third message of
Islam seriously. He illustrates how the pursuit of the Mecca pathways of ijtihad
(which are non-discriminatory (for believers of Islam, followers of other
religions, and others), fully human rights friendly, and constitutionalism
compliant) shall remain infinitely open. Other faiths have now made similar
inroads on LRP exclusion of comprehensive reason and in support of core
human rights and constitutionalism. What remains distinctive to Abdullahi’s
analysis and action is the emphasis on dialogue and respect for (to pinch Paul
Ricoeur’s expression) “Oneself as Another.”61 The tasks ahead are not easy to
summarize but even when the second order postulates may be developed in some
fine detail, a total rejection of theocratic rule in any form ought to remain a
primary postulate.

60
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, The Synergy and Interdependence of Human Rights, Religion and
Secularism, POLYLOG, https://them.polylog.org/3/faa-en.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2022).
61
PAUL RICOEUR, ONESELF AS ANOTHER 3 (Kathleen Blamey trans., 1992); see Edi Pucci, Review of Paul
Ricoeur’s Oneself as Another: Personal Identity, Narrative Identity and “Selfhood” in the Thought of Paul
Ricoeur, 18 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 185, 185 (1992).

